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Big Data Risk Assessment the 21st Century approach to safety science 
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SUMMARY 
 
Safety Science has been developed over time with notable models in the early 20th Century such as Heinrich’s 
iceberg model and the Swiss cheese model. Common techniques such fault tree and event tree analyses, 
HAZOP analysis and bow-ties construction are widely used within industry. These techniques are based on 
the concept that failures of a system can be caused by deviations or individual faults within a system, 
combinations of latent failures, or even where each part of a complex system is operating within normal bounds 
but a combined effect creates a hazardous situation. 
 
In this era of Big Data, systems are becoming increasingly complex, producing such a large quantity of data 
related to safety that cannot be meaningfully analysed by humans to make decisions or uncover complex 
trends that may indicate the presence of hazards. More subtle and automated techniques for mining these 
data are required to provide a better understanding of our systems and the environment within which they 
operate, and insights to hazards that may not otherwise be identified. Big Data Risk Analysis (BDRA) is a suite 
of techniques being researched to identify the use of non-traditional techniques from big data sources to 
predict safety risk. 
 
This paper describes early trials of BDRA that have been conducted on railway signal information and text-
based reports of railway safety near misses and the ongoing research that is looking at combining various 
data sources to uncover obscured trends that cannot be identified by considering each source individually. 
The paper also discusses how visual analytics may be a key tool in analysing Big Data to support knowledge 
elicitation and decision-making, as well as providing information in a form that can be readily interpreted by a 
variety of audiences. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Analysis of Big Data requires a suite of methods that process the large amounts that are present in modern 
system, such as the internet. Big Data is generally defined as very large sources of data (volume), that arrive 
at the input very quickly (velocity), from many sources (variety), with many different data types (value), and 
possibly with unknown accuracy (veracity). These qualities form the five Vs of Big Data; Figure 1 illustrates 
this concept within the GB Railways. 
 
 
Figure 1: The five Vs of big data 
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BDRA is a step-change risk management because it provides the toolbox to perform statistical analysis of all 
relevant risk data rather than estimating probabilities from samples or limited datasets, and therefore reduces 
the need for risk-based models that rely on assumptions or simplifications to produce risk estimates. 
 
BIG DATA RISK ANALYSIS 
 
The BDRA program at the University of Huddersfield aims to investigate whether and how rail safety and risk 
management could benefit from the new software tools that computer scientists develop today. In practice 
BDRA involves cloud-computing software tools that combine structured and unstructured data sources to 
support management decisions and is comprised of systems that: 
  extract data from mixed data sources;  process them quickly to infer and present relevant safety management information;  combine applications to collectively provide sensible interpretation; and  use online interfaces to connect the right people at the right time. 
 
The outcome of this process is intended to provide better decision support for safety and risk management 
than would be possible by considering the data sources individually or only in small combinations. Our 
research to date has identified the following basic enablers of a BDRA system: 
  data processing;  data structure within an ontology;   visualisation of raw data and derived results; and  analytics. 
 
 
These enablers have to be integrated to produce the emergent behaviour of BDRA, as illustrated in Figure 2. 
A suggested by its name: data is the basis of BDRA: modern technological systems in the GB Railways 
produce massive amounts of data. For instance, a useful data source is the data produced by supervisory 
control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, which consist of coded signals that use internet communication 
channels to remotely control equipment. These signals typically include error messages and information about 
the state if a piece of equipment. For safety and risk purposes, dedicated databases are maintained where 
error messages are stored for further analysis. In addition, the Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB) 
maintains a database of millions of reportable safety incidents from the railway. In combination, these data 
sources can provide a powerful insight into how the operation and failure of equipment contribute to failures 
and accidents on the railway.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Basic enablers for BDRA 
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Ontology is the systematic classification of domain knowledge that supports the use of different databases in 
a meaningful way: it can be compared to a search engine which holds the right search keys to produce results 
that are relevant to the human operator. The search keys are based on a repository of concepts and words 
that represent the knowledge structure of a specific domain. In this case the domain is safety and risk for the 
GB railways, the concepts are the ways in which the components within the domain combine and interact to 
create the emergent behaviour of the overall system. 
 
Visualisation is a powerful, and arguably the only useful, tool for understanding large quantities of data. 
Hundreds of different visualisation techniques are available to provide output of data (e.g. geospatial risks), 
however modern visual analytics tools also provide the ability to interact with the data to modify how the data 
is structured, how queries are performed, and how different users of a system can learn from the experiences 
of others. 
 
Analytics is the software and data processing engine that forms the backbone of any computer-based risk 
analysis tool. For BDRA the computer system is a cloud-based computer that can processes and store large 
amounts of data. Software for analysis on distributed systems is different from software packages that run on 
a single computer. For BDRA several different software tools have to run in parallel and the results of these 
tools have to be combined into a higher layer of the software hierarchy. At the top-most layer, the software 
can enable access of the data via the internet. 
 
 
COMPONENTS 
 
This section describes how each of the enablers depicted in figure 2 are implemented for practical 
implementation of BDRA. Respectively they are data, ontology, visualization and analytics. This paper 
provides only an overview of the key components, fully details are available in our previous work, for example 
Stow et al. 2015; Hughes & Figueres-Esteban 2015; Hughes et al. 2015, Figueres-Esteban 2015 et al. 2015, 
Van Gulijk et al. 2015. 
 
Data (Close Call) 
 
The first enabler is data. This section treats the procedures and some analysis of text-based data that is 
relevant for BDR: the Close Call database. A close call is a hazardous situation where the event sequence 
could lead to an accident if it had not been interrupted by a planned intervention or by random event (Gnoni 
et al. 2013). Network Rail workers and specific sub-contractors within the GB Railway industry are asked to 
report such events in the Close Call database. Close Call reports are freeform text reports where users can 
describe a situation that, in their view, could have led to an accident. Providing a free text format for data entry 
allows the reporter the ability to describe hazards in a rich way that would not be possible if data entry were 
constrained, for example by selecting hazard types from a pre-defined list. The Close Call Database contains 
approximately 200,000 entries that have been collected over a period of two years. Due to the large number 
of records, it is impractical to manually review the records and therefore computer-based techniques have 
been developed to extract safety relevant information from them. 
 
Since the key information relevant to safety management is found in the free text, Natural Language 
Processing (NLP) techniques are is used. NLP has been an emerging area of study over the past two decades 
in the domains of road safety and medicine (Allen 1994, Wu & Heydecker 1998, Dale et al. 2000). One of the 
key problems in NLP is the inherent ambiguity in written language, including the use of jargon, abbreviations, 
misspelling and lack of punctuation. Processing of close call data by extracting information from free text 
involves five processes (Hughes & Figueres-Esteban, 2015): 
  text cleansing, tokenizing, and tagging;  ontology parsing and coding;  clustering (creation of groups of records that are semantically similar);  text analysis; and  information extraction. 
 
The exact procedure is described in Hughes et al. 2015. This paper highlights two results of the information 
extraction process. 
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Figure 3. Frequencies of Workforce incidents in SMIS and Close Call. 
 
The first information extraction process was the identification of incidents with track workers. The database of 
railway report incidents database shows that incidents with track workers take place more frequently between 
the hours of 11:00 and 15:00. An analysis was performed to investigate whether the same pattern is present 
in the close call database. An automated search query was programmed to retrieve the protection / possession 
arrangements events in the close call database as function of time-of-day. The results were compared with 
track worker near miss events in the incident database as function of time-of- day and with all events in the 
close call database as a function of time-of-day. 
 
The relative distributions of these events by time of day are shown in Figure 3, which shows that the incident 
database and close call reports follow similar trends during the day. However further examination shows that 
the times at which reports are made for all close calls are similar to the times reports are made for protection 
arrangements; suggesting that there may be a reporting bias that interferes with the actually hazard report. 
The high fraction of close call events between 00:00 and 01:00 is likely to be due to a default of the reporting 
system that sets the time-stamp to 00:00 when the time of the incident is not entered by the person making 
the entry. 
 
A similar problem was investigated in relation to trespassing to address the question: do trespasses take place 
at certain times of the day or do they take place with equal probability throughout a 24 hour period? Figure 3 
suggests that trespass does not occur with equal frequency: the trend seems that they occur more frequently 
during working hours. What causes this trend is as yet unexplained but similar to the possession entries, 
reporting bias may play a role. 
 
Ontology 
 
The second enabler is ontology, which captures interrelating concepts in risk systems. Text parsing, tokenizing 
and tagging for Close Calls are based on ontologies (explained in the prior paragraph). Dahlgren (1995) 
suggests that concept-based ontologies are well suited for computer-based systems that attempt to provide a 
“world view”. In this context a world view is a naive description of what there is in the world and how these 
components should be classified. Naive means that conceptualisation and classification take place on 
relatively shallow or common-sense assumptions in a dominant belief system. Guarino (1997) illustrates naive 
ontology building based prior work by Genesereth & Nilsson (1987). Consider five blocks (numbered a, b, c, 
d and e) in two separate piles on top of a table (Figure 4). A possible conceptualization can be given by: 
 
<{a, b, c, d, e}, {on, above, clear, table}> 
 
Where {a, b, c, d, e} is the universe under consideration: the blocks we are interested in. The set {on, above, 
clear, table} describes the relevant relations where table entails the concept of an object holding the blocks, 
clear entails the concept of not touching, and on and above are relations between objects and concepts. This 
naive conceptualization enables all possible combinations of blocks in two different stacks on the table without 
the need to create new rules. So different instances (e.g. instance a, b and c, d and instance a, c, e and d, b) 
are both allowed with the same conceptualization which reduces the complexity of the description of the world 
view. This reduction of complexity is of great value in the computer science domain and is also sufficient for 
most analyses since humans normally use a shallow layer of knowledge to describe meaning and intentions: 
Dahlgren (1995) states that nearly 80% of common-sense reasoning is based on the naive approach. Papers 
by Smith & Welty (2001), Noy & McGuiness (2001) and the RDF-documentation of the  
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Figure 4: One naive conceptualization, 2 real world instances. Incredibly powerful in computer 
science. 
 
 
World Wide Web consortium (W3C) demonstrate that this is the standard approach in the computer sciences 
today.  
 
Visualisation 
 
Visualization is the third enabler. In order to test value of visualisation for BDRA a visual-analysis was 
performed of Close Call text. We undertook this analysis in accordance with the data extraction methodology 
proposed by Paranyushkin (2011). Since the objective was to assess whether groups of similar hazards could 
be identified through visual analysis, a pre-constructed dataset was used. A sample of 150 records was 
constructed from selecting the 50 data records from the Close Call database classified as trespass, slip / trip 
hazards on site and level crossing. These records were cleansed using the natural language toolkit in Python 
(Bird et al. 2009) and the tagging and tokenization processes described in Hughes et al. (2015) were applied 
to create two types of text for visualising. The entire process of cleansing, tagging and tokenization is illustrated 
in the Table 1. 
 
The visual analysis was performed by constructing the two-word-gap and five-word-gap networks and 
representing the networks with the Gephi software (Paranyushkin 2011). The networks obtained from the text 
were composed of nodes related to tags (e.g. geo_place, elr_code or distance_tag), tokens (e.g. 
level_crossing_, road_vehicle_, access_ or network_rail_) and words (e.g. location, trespasser or pedestrian). 
In order to gather knowledge from the networks the size of the nodes were scaled to represent the connections 
between individual words and tokens. The Louvain method for community detection with enough resolution 
was applied to represent large clusters from the networks (Blondel et al. 2008). The Louvain community 
detection algorithm detected four clusters from the five-word-tokenised text network with a resolution of 1.5. 
The result gives a modularity of 0.6 (Paranyushkin 2011). Figure 5 represents one of the clusters detected. 
 
The cluster in Figure 5 shows high degree nodes with a high betweeness (cross_, geo_place, distance_tag 
and location). In addition we can also find a great quantity of high and medium degree nodes related to level 
crossings (e.g. elr_code, level_crossing, road, box_signal_ or signaller_). Moreover, the clusters present 
important differences regarding nodes related to people and type of terms used, for example nodes related to 
technical staff (network_rail_, operative, member_of_staff or signaler) and terms such as signal box, cctv_, 
elr_code, cess, not working, approach_, clear_, main_, line_, dn_, up_ or downside. The visual analysis 
provided insights into the data that were obscured when only the textual data was shown, these insights 
allowed for further refinement of the tokenisation process (removing stopwords and stemming plurals or 
verbs). 
 
 
 
Johannesburg, South Africa, 4-10 October 2015 
Original record 
Emailed report from LOM<br /> <br /><p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Arial" 
size="2"><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: 10pt">Date: 08/09/13 
</span></font><font face="Arial" size="2"><span style="font-family: arial; font-
size: 10pt">Time: 1900<p></p></span></font> </p><p></p><p></p><p 
class="MsoNormal"><font face="Arial" size="2"><span style="font-family: arial; font-
size: 10pt"><p> <font face="Arial" size="2"><span style="font-family: arial; font-
size: 10pt">ELR: LEN3 59m 14ch</span></font><font face="Arial" size="2"><span 
style="font-family: arial; font-size: 10pt"> 
</span></font></p></span></font></p><p></p><font face="Arial" size="2"><span 
style="font-family: arial; font-size: 10pt">Issue – Trespasser on the line in the 
Hartburn Junction area. Trains cautioned, reported all clear by MOM @ 
1930</span></font><p></p><font face="Arial" size="2"><span style="font-family: 
arial; font-size: 10pt">Action – Fencing to be checked 
09/09/13<p></p></span></font><p></p><p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Arial" 
size="2"><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: 10pt"><p> <font face="Arial" 
size="2"><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: 10pt">DU: 
<city></city><place></place> Newcastle<p></p> </span></font></p></span> 
</font></p><p></p><!-- RICH TEXT --> 
 
Cleaned record 
Emailed report from LOM Date: 08/09/13 Time: 1900 ELR: LEN3 59m 14ch Issue – 
Trespasser on the line in the Hartburn Junction area. Trains cautioned, reported all 
clear by MOM @ 1930 Action – Fencing to be checked 09/09/13 DU: Newcastle 
 
Cleaned and tagged record in lowercase 
emailed report from local operation manager date _date_ time _time_ elr_code 
distance_tag issue trespasser on the railway line in the geo_place junction area 
trains cautioned reported all clear by mobile operations manager _time_ action 
fencing to be checked _date_ geo_place 
 
Cleaned, tagged and tokenized record without stopwords and in lowercase 
email report from local operate_ manager_ date _date_ time _time_ elr_code 
distance_tag issue trespasser on railway_ line_ in geo_place junction_ area_ train_ 
warning_ reported all clear_ by mobile_operations_manager_ _time_ action fence_ 
check_ _date_ geo_place 
 
Table 1: Cleaning, tagging and tokenization processes in one trespass record 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Network graph of Close Call word associations filtered the nodes larger than 20 degree. 
 
Johannesburg, South Africa, 4-10 October 2015 
 
Figure 6: RAATS graphical user interface (GUI). 
 
 
 
Analytics (RAATS) 
 
The last, and arguably most important enabler is analytics. Analytics turn data into information. The RAATS 
project does exactly that. An event where a train passes a signal showing a red (stop) aspect without 
authorization is known as a signal passed at danger (SPAD). SPADs can range from minor incidents where a 
signal is passed by only a few meters, to events that results in train collisions: following a SPAD at Ladbroke 
Grove in 1999, a collision occurred which resulted in 31 fatalities (HSE, 2000). Since that time, the GB rail 
industry has made significant efforts to reduce the rate of SPADs. 
 
Traditionally, SPAD risks are analysed using a process which examines the potential consequences of passing 
a particular signal at danger. A weakness in the traditional analysis was that it is unknown how many times 
trains approach a signal when it is displaying a red aspect. The RAATS project addresses that shortcoming 
by analysing live data from signalling systems. The source of the information used in the RAATS software is 
train describer data (NR, 2015). A train describer is an electronic device connected to each signalling panel 
which provides a description of each train (its ‘headcode’) and which section of track (or ‘track section’) it 
currently occupies. RAATS software reads the train describer live-feed, stores the data, and most importantly 
calculates which trains actually approach a red aspect. The red approaches to a single signal can be analysed 
over a period from a single day to a period of a year. Alternatively the user can choose to analyse all signals 
in an area or even all the signals in the database. 
 
Figure 6 shows the RAATS graphical user interface. This image shows the results for a single signal ET776 
which is located on the up Cowdenbeath line at Redford. The figure shows that 23% of trains approached the 
signal at red in the period of the 17 August to 13 October 2014, which is a high percentage compared with the 
average for the network. In this way, RAATS software analytics provide intricate details about the number of 
trains approaching a signal at danger. RAATS adds value to safety on the GB railways by analysing a large 
live data feed in a way that supports risk analysis. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The GB Railways are a source of large amount of data from a variety of data-sources, producing data very 
quickly. The BDRA research programme at the University of Huddersfield aims to investigate whether and 
how rail safety and risk management could benefit from the new software tools that computer scientists 
develop today. BDRA is a step-change in the accuracy of risk estimation because it provides the toolbox to 
perform statistical analysis of all relevant risk data rather than estimating probabilities from samples or limited 
datasets, and therefore reduces the need for risk-based models that rely on assumptions or simplifications to 
produce risk estimates. 
 
Four enablers have been identified for BDRA: data, ontology, visualisation and analytics. To date, two data 
sources have been analysed to extract safety information from signals and free text reports of railway hazards. 
Visualisation techniques have been applied to support the data analysis. A relatively simple form of ontologies 
has been used in the text analysis. More complex ontologies can be used to classify the concepts that allow 
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combining the information obtained from the different data sources. Analytics have been used to assess how 
many trains approach red aspects. Developing small software applications that combine the four enablers 
have shown that the overall BDRA function has been successful in our research to date. 
 
Whilst this initial work shows how BDRA could benefit safety and risk management for railway safety in Britain, 
it has also demonstrated that implementation and integration of automated data-analytic techniques for safety 
and risk is not straightforward. The BDRA process requires novel risk analysis techniques, semantic 
techniques, interactive visualisation techniques for performing data analysis and dedicated computer systems; 
many of which have to be researched in dedicated collaboration projects between safety scientists, information 
technologists, software developers and railway engineers.  
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